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THE PUBLIC AND THE STATE BAR"'
CHARLES C. WIsE, JR. :"*
T HE world is on the move, and we, as lawyers, must keep pace.
In a measure, we should chart the direction of travel.
While the proper administration of justice is an important
concern of every citizen, does not the public have every reasonable
right to expect literally everything from the bench and bar in lead-
ing the way to improvement in the broad field of administration of
justice? Not only must we conduct the matters our clients have
entrusted to us with honesty and competency, but we must also
constantly consider ways and means of fulfilling our public trust
more efficiently. To do this, we should ascertain what the public
thinks about us.
That the lawyer must give serious consideration to public
opinion is at once obvious. No court, no lawyer, law or bar group
can exist in a vacuum set apart from laymen; we are wholly depend-
ent upon the public for our professional employment and our
livelihood. And today the need to analyze fairly and objectively
what the public thinks of lawyers and the law is more important
than ever before. This century has seen tremendous inroads made
upon the practice of law, not only by* competitive businesses and
professions, but also by the development and extension of far
flung extra-legal tribunals for the settlement of controversies. Law-
yers have long been critical of bureaus, administrative agencies and
arbitration panels, and it is believed that litigants and the public
generally are likewise convinced that such tribunals do not render
as good a brand of justice as courts are capable of providing.
Why, then, have we witnessed the twilight of the courts and
the ever-increasing expansion of extra-legal means of settling con-
troversies? Some believe that one cause for this situation is the
poor public relations of lawyers and bar groups with the public;
and that improving public relations may ameliorate our difficulties.
Others, with sound reasons, believe that the bar now enjoys the
best public relations it has ever had in the long history of the pro-
fession. There are more lawyers doing more business and handling
more important matters now than ever before, and there is a bare
The substance hereof is taken from the address of the president of the
West Virginia State Bar, at its anual meeting in Charleston, West Virginia,
October 6, 1950.
**President of the West Virginia State Bar, 1949-50; member of the
Kanawha County bar.
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minimum of defalcation on the part of the practitioner to bring
disrepute upon the profession as a whole.
Is it not reasonable, then, to suggest that the answer to the
problem goes much deeper than mere matters of public relations,
however important that subject may be? Most West Virginia attor-
neys are cognizant of the survey conducted among laymen in Iowa
a few years ago, which disclosed that long delays and high fees
constituted by far the major criticisms of our courts and of the legal
profession.' We, of course, can show that lawyers' office and other
costs have sky-rocketed, and we can rationalize in our minds the
delays (some justifiable) which all must admit do exist in disposing
of legal matters. At the same time, there is more than a little
truth in the public's appraisal of bench and bar, and we must meet
these criticisms straightforwardly. In the final analysis, what the
public thinks of us must not only be recognized, but will control
the future of the profession. If it be true that the public does not
prefer administrative tribunals and arbitration proceedings, but
by experience businesses and individuals have found that they can
resolve their difficulties by such methods, however somewhat im-
perfectly, a great deal more expeditiously and at far less cost than
in a court of law, certainly we should do our part to stem this tide
which endangers both the caliber of service to the public and our
profession.
Doubless some of you were startled to see in the August, 1950,
American Bar Association Journal a table which lists West Virginia
forty-third among the forty-eight states on the basis of acceptance
of the minimum standards of judicial administration, and these
are minimum standards, mind you, worked out and approved by
the American Bar Association more than ten years ago. Of even
more startling import, our state ranks forty-seventh among all the
states of the union respecting evidence and is fourth from the bot-
tom respecting trial practice. These minimum standards cover nine
general subjects, 2 and if it were not for the fact that West Virginia's
legislature has recognized the inherent rule-making power of the
courts respecting items of practice and procedure,3 has provided
an administrative assistant to the supreme court,4 and, if our Su-
preme Court of Appeals had not provided by rule for pre-trial
: See The U. S. Bar, 39 FoRTUNE 90 (May 1949).
2 Porter, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration, 36 A.B.A.J. 614
(1950).
3 W. VA. CODE C. 51, art. 1, § 4 (Michie, 1949).
4 W. VA. CODE c. 51, art. 1, § 15 (Michie, 1949).
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conferencesr it might very well be that West Virginia would be
found at the bottom of the list instead of ranking forty-third. As
it is, our state in twenty-nine particulars received the lowest rating.
It is not unfair, then, to state that our working rules are defective,
even by standards set by fellow lawyers.
Respect for the court and for the legal profession is dependent
upon what the public thinks about these working methods of our
courts and the bar. If we are honest in an appraisal of our system,
we must admit, however reluctantly, that many anachronisms exist
in our practice which are no longer found in any place where the
Anglo-Saxon system of law prevails. While comparisons are diffi-
cult, it can be said with considerable truth that West Virginia
retains many of the artificial technicalities of the common law
which were abolished in some of the states of the union a century
ago and in England, the mother of our common law system, more
than seventy-five years ago. It may be further said with a fair
degree of accuracy that West Virginia retains more of the charac-
teristics of the common law, both in substance and in practice and
procedure, as it obtained in England three centuries ago, than any
other state of the English-speaking world.
To characterize common law pleading and practice as anach-
ronistic and dilatory cannot be done lightly by a West Virginia
lawyer, for it holds a tenacious grip upon our minds. Many of
our ablest practitioners look upon common law pleading and our
system of law, as did Blackstone, as the very epitome of logic and
reason; and any suggestion of change thereof is to be beaten down
with every force at the command of the profession. 6 In a sense,
this attitude has characterized every effort to reform the law, and
it is to be expected of a conservative, intelligent profession. Few
of us would quarrel with those who believe the common law system
to be the most logical ever devised by man and its mastery an art.
But by the same token, a mathematical puzzle or a chess game is
absolutely perfect from the standpoint of logic and reason, but a
puzzle or game may not provide the most speedy and inexpensive
settlement of disputes. 7 A lawsuit should not be a contest between
attorneys with the victory going to the more experienced common
5 Rule XV, RULES OF PRACTICE FOR TRIAL COuRTs (1945).
0 Wyckoff, Our Changing Common Law, 48 W. VA. L.Q. 25 (1941).
7 These statements are not to be construed as an indictment of the
common law system as a whole. That the great body of substantive law
is the bulwark of our jurisprudence cannot be challenged or denied. But
it is believed the efficacy of common law pleading and practice as distinguished
from substance is another story.
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law pleader. The object of every judicial inquiry is to arrive at
the truth and the simplest and easiest way of ascertainment thereof
should be the rule, rather than adherence to many artificial barriers
which may not only becloud, but, in many instances, actually may
prevent the attainment of a just solution to a case. Even the few
practitioners who are masters of common law pleading and practice
must realize that to every one of such experts there are nine other
lawyers who have an inadequate grasp of its intricacies and techni-
calities which can be mastered only after years of study and practice.
Trial by battle, trial by wager and other barbarisms are just as
much a part of our common law heritage as its rules of pleading.
The former have long been discarded; yet the ghosts of the latter
are still with us.
8
Once we lawyers are convinced that common law pleading and
practice is no longer adequate or desirable for efficient handling of
disputes, the further question remains of how and with what we
can effect a change for the better. Basically, there are two alterna-
tives: legislation and the rule-making power.
Experience has proved rather conclusively that legislation is
not suitable for the revamping of procedural rules. The legislative
codification of laws of practice and procedure has never proved
altogether satisfactory either in this country or in England. Legis-
lative reform is piecemeal, frequently drafted hastily and with the
sole object in mind of remedying some manifest defect in a par-
ticular case. The so-called code states, such as New York, which
have attempted voluminous and comprehensive legislative enact-
ments are now bogged down by the fossilization of their codes. The
rule-making power of the courts, on the other hand, it is believed,
offers a more constructive means of modernizing practice and pro-
cedure. England was one of the first to recognize the feasibility
of this power in dealing with reform in the law. Many states have
enjoyed the same benefits, one of the most recent of which is Vir-
ginia, which on February 1, 1950, by twenty-two short rules pro-
mulgated by the supreme court of appeals of that commonwealth,
occupying only eight printed pages, wiped out the vestiges of com-
mon law pleading and practice and provided simple but compre-
hensive practice and procedure for all actions at law.
The use of the rule-making power affords more flexibility,
more opportunity for experimentation by trial and error, lends
. 8 See Wyckoff, supra note 6, and Nesbitt, The Proposed Changes in
Federal Practice, 43 W. VA. L.Q. 23 (1936), 110 (1937).
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itself to easy amendment of any defective rule, and of significant
importance, it places responsibility on bench and bar for improving
the machinery of justice where it rightfully belongs, rather than in
the legislature.
Believing that the rule-making power should be exercised in
West Virginia, where should we look for guidance? It is respect-
fully suggested that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
admirably suited for use within this state. Most of us have had
experience with the Federal Rules which were adopted in 1938,
and thus have twelve years of intensive experience to recommend
them. Since their inception, thirteen states have adopted the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in whole or in part, for their
own civil practice, and vigorous campaigns for the adoption thereof
are now being waged in nine other states. Recently, rules for
criminal procedure have been adopted in the federal courts; one
state, New Jersey, has adopted them, and three other states are
seeking to put them into effect.9
Time will not permit us here to analyze and discuss in detail
the advantages of the Federal Rules. This has been done by able
students of the law."' There are, however, certain significant ad-
vantages which may be summarized. It is believed that we would
achieve the following, among other benefits:
First: We would abolish all technical forms of action at law,
such as covenant, debt, assumpsit, detinue, trespass, etc., and substi-
tute one form of action. Is there any of us who has not been puzzled
at times (even after days of study) to determine just what form of
action under our existing system of pleading should be brought?
Second: The distinctions between law and equity would be
eliminated. It is doubtful if there is any lawyer in the state who
has not been embarrassed by bringing a suit at law which the court
holds should have been brought in equity or vice versa. We let the
same judge act as chancellor and sit in actions at law, and it would
seem no purpose is served by the present distinction.
Third: Under the Federal Rules, instead of an intricate, prolix
declaration, we would simply set forth a short and plain statement
of the claim or claims of our client in Plain English. For example,
Form 9 appended to the Federal Rules, a complaint for negligence,
9 From information furnished by the American Judicature Society, Ann
Arbor, Michigan.
10 Lugar, Common Law Pleading Modified Versus the Federal Rules, 52
W. VA. L. REv. 137 (1950), and the excellent bibliography found in notes
thereto.
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merely alleges that on a certain date in a public highway called
Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant drove a motor
vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing the highway, as a
result of which plaintiff was knocked down, had his leg broken, was
otherwise injured, was prevented from transacting his business,
suffered great pain of body and mind, incurred medical expenses of
one thousand dollars, and concludes with a demand for judgment
of ten thousand dollars. Do any of you think that our courts would
hold a declaration in this state good, phrased so simply?", How
many days has each of us wasted in preparing common law declara-
tions, frequently with many counts, which perhaps tended more
to confuse than clarify the issues?
Fourth: A multiplicity of technical pleadings under the com-
mon law would be obliterated. Demurrers, pleas in abatement,
rejoinders, special pleas, rebutters, etc., could no longer be used.
Why should a lawyer have to struggle for half a day on a plea of
the general issue, if there is one, in an action of covenant?
Fifth: Every lawyer would be as much at home in the federal
courts as in the state courts from the procedural standpoint, and
after all, if a client is entitled to the same relief, is there a very good
excuse for giving him a more delayed and expensive type of justice
in a state court than prevails in the United States court house,
across the street?
Sixth: Under such rules it would be possible for a litigant to
secure in the same action a determination of every justiciable claim
that he has against the other in one suit, and, of course, if a third
party has an interest in any part thereof, he could be joined and
all matters disposed of in one proceeding.
Seventh: Under the Federal Rules there is great improvement
in appellate procedure by reducing the allowable period of time for
taking appeals from eight months to sixty days, and provision made
for printing only so much of the record, as appendices to the briefs,
as counsel consider necessary. In every other particular the federal
appellate practice is simpler and cheaper than state practice and
delays are greatly reduced.
Eighth: Those who are experienced in using the Federal Rules
are agreed, in general, that they reduce the time required for the
final determination of a suit by at least one-half as compared with
11 It is ironical to note that this form is a verbatim copy of Chitty's
common law form of action of trespass on the case and has been the statutory
form for negligence in Massachusetts for years.
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common law practice.'12 Thus, by reason of the simplicity and
expediency of the actual litigation, the practitioner would not have
to devote so much time to technical and artificial rules, and he
could handle perhaps twice as many suits in the same time and with
the same effort. And, since he could handle more work, he could
charge less for each individual case.
The time is ripe for affirmative action on the part of the bench
and bar to protect both the public and the profession by discarding
our outmoded system and adopting better machinery for the admin-
istration of justice. The Judicial Council of this state, to its great
credit, is aware of our need and has recently appointed a special
subcommittee to consider the whole field of practice and procedure.
The State Bar is cooperating fully in this great work. To achieve
a truly satisfactory solution, however, requires the active interest
and thoughtful contribution of every member of the profession.
Since the citizens of West Virginia through the legislature have
properly seen fit to entrust the Supreme Court of Appeals with the
rule-making power, a corresponding responsibility of using such
power wisely and well is thrust upon bench and bar. Whether you
agree with the conclusions stated here is of little importance. The
only point of vital significance is whether we shall heed the public
demand and help provide the highest quality of justice with the
least delay at the lowest cost of which we are capable.
Woodrow Wilson some years ago stated that "A bar association
should be greater than the individual lawyer. It should embody
not the individual ambition of the practitioner, but the point of
view of society with regard to the profession." It is believed that
no legal system can long survive or command public respect and
confidence unless it meets the shrewd native sense of justice of the
people of our land. Nor should it survive. The law is not a game
of chance. It should be an effective method of resolving disputes.
Of course, it will never be perfect because it is human, but striving
for the goal is and must be the destiny of our profession.
-' Contrast the views of Wyckoff, supra note 6, who says: "Past time and
events have shown that where justice should be done and wise conclusions
reached, there should be calm deliberation-not haste .... We are now living,
legislating, litigating, deciding in a hurry." See also, Holdsworth, The Year
Books, 22 L.Q. Rav. 360, 382 (1906), who says: "Its [the common law] weak-
ness is caused largely by the very defects which are inherent in its virtues ....
It can only advance step by step from precedent to precedent. It cannot
disregard the logical consequences of its principles, though in practice their
application may be inconvenient. It is loath to admit new principles, and
will not do so unless compelled by such considerations as the loss of business
consequent upon the competition of a rival court."
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